Reconsidering Corporate Ratings by Hassani, Bertrand & Zhao, Xin
Reconsidering Corporate Ratings
Bertrand Hassani, Xin Zhao
To cite this version:
Bertrand Hassani, Xin Zhao. Reconsidering Corporate Ratings. Documents de travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.77 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2014. <hal-01117683>
HAL Id: hal-01117683
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01117683
Submitted on 17 Feb 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconsidering Corporate Ratings 
 
Bertrand HASSANI, Xin ZHAO 
 
2014.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
Reconsidering Corporate Ratings
Bertrand Hassani∗and Xin Zhao†
Abstract
In this paper, a new corporate ratings methodology is proposed. In this innovating approach cor-
porate ratings are calibrated from data with different frequency in two-steps. Information of firms’
credit quality from annual accounting ratios and daily credit derivative spreads yields are combined
through a Bayesian approach. To test the performance of this new rating, an empirical analysis is
carried out on a sample of 197 public traded international corporations with credit ratings from the
big-three credit rating agencies. The ratings generated from the presented approach perform better
than the ratings from the external agencies as it is more representative of companies’ credit quality
over time, therefore this approach is a suitable alternative to internal rating methods.
JEL: C23; E44; G15
Keywords: Corporate Rating, Market Implied Rating, Corporate Bond Yields.
1 Introduction
Credit risk is the risk that counterparts default on their obligations, i.e. the risk that a debtor cannot
fulfill his repayment obligations. Credit events include the loss of the principal, the default on interest,
cash flows disruption or cost escalation. The losses related to credit events vary in amounts and causes.
For example, a company which fails to pay one of it’s employee on the due date for special reason is
mechanically considered as default. Therefore, the occurrence of a credit event is not necessarily an
evidence of the risk of the investment. In order to limit the risk of losing the money to potentially lent
to borrowers, sovereigns, companies, etc, a bank should undertake various verifications and evaluate the
potential loss engendered by potential credit events.
Corporate ratings represent key factors for financial institutions to evaluate the credit risk of investing in
the rated companies. In the global financial markets, external corporate ratings are issued by credit rating
agencies (CRAs). Among the CRAs, the top three (i.e. Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch’s Rating) occupy more
than 95% of the market. The power of CRAs has been showed during the last decade, where the ratings
have been applied as a global benchmark of corporate credit risk. For instance, it has been required by
Basel II for the calculation of credit capital requirement for certain banks (BIS (1996)[4]). Nevertheless,
the late and slow reaction to the default of Enron, Worldcom and Lehman Brother undermined the trust
of their ratings from people who relied on them to make investment decisions. The inherent conflict of
interesting in the credit rating industry exhibited by Becker and Milbourn (2011)[6] and Bolton et al.
(2012)[9] implies many questions on the CRAs. The credit rating crisis of 2007-2008 raised the doubts
on CRAs’ credibility. Evidence of “rating shopping” shadowed their reputation (Benmelech and Dlugosz
(2010)[7]). Credit risk matters to everyone in the market. Thus, corporate ratings should be precise and
accurate. The new regulation and supervision authorities require more prudent rating methodologies
(BIS(2011)[5]). Investors, entrepreneur, financial institutions have been relying on and will still rely on
credit ratings to make decisions even though the external ratings have been criticised and doubted for
long (White (2010)[29]). Trustable evaluations of the creditworthiness of corporations are required by the
fast growing market. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to introduce a new approach which improves
the traditional corporate rating methodology and furthermore provides useful credit references to market
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practitioners.
Two branches of studies have been built up for corporate ratings in literature, the accounting-data-based
approach and the market-data-based approach. The first one (the traditional approach) is based on
fundamental analysis using accounting data. Altman (1968)[1] introduce the Z-Score model that build
the relationship between accounting data and corporate credit quality. Lo (1986)[25] and Altman et al.
(1994)[2] extend the analysis to logit models. Kim and Sohn (2008)[23] apply the random effects model
for the study of credit rating. The advantages of this approach are intuitive and based on fundamentals.
The main drawbacks are the data limitation and time delay. It cannot adjust to or reflect updated
information (Heflin et al. (2011)[18]). Financial statements reflect what happened in the past, while
market prices are forward looking. An appealing corporate rating, however, should be consistent with
the market, such that it will neither bring surprises nor be completely anticipated. Therefore, market-
data-based approach arose during the last decades. Ederington et al. (1987)[14] measure the influence
of ratings on bond yields; Hull et al. (2004)[20] examine the theoretical relationship among bond yields,
CDS spreads and credit rating; Micu et al. (2004)[26] study the link between ratings and CDS using
event study method; Daniels and Jensen (2005)[13] use principal component analysis, regression and
event study methods to study the relation of CDS spreads, credit spreads and credit rating; Jorion and
Zhang (2007)[22] discuss the effect of ratings on stock prices; Flannery et al. (2010)[15] and Hart and
Zingales (2011)[17] suggest that CDS spreads are substitutes of credit ratings; Chen et al. (2013) control
difference in default risk which are not captured by ratings by a “distance to default” measure according
to the Moody’s KMVTM default prediction model with a large data set of CDS spreads. This approach
picks up more subtle and fast-moving changes of credit relevant data, such that market sentiment de-
livered through market data can be captured. The drawback is that the stability of ratings may be
impaired regarding the higher volatility of market information. Nevertheless, considering the fact that
investors prefer to minimise transition costs, rating stability is desired and important. In sum, these two
approaches are both based on valuable information of corporate credibility. Each of them has pros and
cons. Past analysis proved the importance of both resources of information. The natural of the data
frequency, however, brings the difficulty to combine them. The contribution of this paper is to introduce
a new approach to combine these two information sets. Using this new approach, we can provide better
corporate ratings as more reliable, subjective, efficient, and stable.
As we mentioned, the frequency difference of the accounting data and market data causes the fact that
it is difficult to put them in a single model. The solution suggested is to evaluate the credit score from
the two information sets separately, and then combine them through credibility theory. To test the per-
formance of this new approach, an empirical study is carried out in two steps. In the first step, a sample
of accounting data and market values of the corporations rated by the three major CRAs is collected for
the study. These data are used to explore the relationships between accounting data, market data and
ratings. In the second step, the new ratings averaged from the accounting ratings and CDS ratings are
compared to the CRAs’ ratings. This approach has several advantages compared to the traditional ones.
The low frequency accounting data and the timeless market data are combined in the estimates which
make a rating reflecting both fundamental and market sentiment. Secondly, credibility weight are given
to accounting-data-based ratings and market-price-based ratings with respect to the variance of the two
ratings in order to obtain a relatively stable rating framework.
The paper is organised as follows. Methodologies of accounting-data-based and market-price-based ratings
are expressed in the next section. The algorithm to calculate the weights is also given in Section 2. Our
empirical analysis is exhibited in Section 3, while a fourth section concludes.
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2 Methodology
This section introduces the methodology to combine market and accounting data to evaluate the credit
quality of a company. Table 2 presents the mapping to transform the rating letters1 into numeric values,
labeled as credit scores in this context. Credit scores mapped from the external ratings represent the
corporate credit quality evaluated by the CRAs. The notations used in the model are: Rδ, RAcc and
RCDS , which refer to the final ratings, accounting ratings and CDS ratings respectively; Sδ, SAcc and
SCDS , which refer to the final score, accounting score and CDS score.
The objective is to assign appropriate credit scores to companies in order to generate fair ratings. A
two-steps approach combining the information obtained from the two data sources is proposed to meet
the needs. The underlying idea is a weighted average of the credit score obtained from the two sets of
information, as exhibited in the following model:
Sδ,i = wi · SAcc,i + (1− wi) · SCDS,i (1)
where Sδ,i is the weighted average of credit scores of corporation i implied from accounting data and CDS
data; SAcc,i and SCDS,i are the credit scores of corporation i derived from accounting and CDS data;
and wi is the weight given to the two basic credit scores.
Accounting Score
According to reports published by the largest CRAs (Samson, S. B. (2008)[27], Cantor et al. (2002)[12],
and Hunter et al.(2013)[21]), accounting data is the fundamental resource of their quantitative rating
methodologies2. In literature, models based on accounting ratios have been proposed to evaluate the
credit risk. On the other hand, CRAs’ ratings have been proved can be explained by the accounting
ratios. Based on previous researches, we calibrate the credit score based on accounting data in this sub-
section.
SAcc,i in equation (1) is a function of the accounting ratios, e.g. SAcc,i = f(Acci), where Acci is a matrix
of accounting data. Accounting ratios relevant to companies’ credit quality include leverage ratios, debt
ratios, liquidity ratios, activity ratios, and profitability ratios (Table 4). Previous studies in this field
covered potential models based on linear regression, cross-sectional regression, panel regression, logistic
regression and probit regression, etc. The choice of both the methodology and the accounting variables
are mainly based on empirical analysis of the explanatory power to history default probability. In the
empirical study, we firstly recalibrate CRAs’ quantitative rating methodology. Different models are tested
to find the best model to calculate the accounting data based credit scores. Then, the accounting data
based credit scores are calculated using the best performance model.
Market Score
There are three alternatives of market information reflecting corporate credit quality: bond markets,
equity markets or CDS markets. Among the three potential market information for credit quality of the
underlying entities, CDS are considered as a better proxy than bond and equity prices which are intrinsi-
cally biased (Norden and Weber (2004) and Hull et al. (2004)). CDS spreads implied credit ratings can
quickly adjust themselves to changes in the market (Acharya and Johnson (2007)).
Theoretically, CDS spreads represent pure credit risk. However, in practice there are evidences show-
ing that this does not hold in general. The reason of the variation include liquidity, risk appetite, etc.
Scneider et al. (2007) find evidence that equity market volatility measured by the VIX index influence
the valuation of the CDS. Callen et al (2007) proved that CDS prices are not only decided by the credit
1Since the standard corporate ratings issued by the CRAs are in the alphabetic format, we need to map these letters to
the values which can be used in the study.
2Business risk and corporation governance quality are taken into consideration as part of qualitative criteria.
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quality of the corporation but also by the liquidity of the product and others marginal factors. Therefore,
market risk and liquidity risk premiums are considered at that level. In this study, we follow Fitch’s
market implied rating approach. CDS values are used as a matrix of the credit quality of the company to
derive market implied rating. The approach is extended to filter the market and liquidity risk premium
using relevant market information.
SCDS,i is a function of the market data, e.g. SCDS,i = g(CDSi), where CDSi is a matrix of the CDS
relevant market data of company i. The basic relationship is: higher CDS implied credit scores are
assigned to the companies with lower CDS values. CDS values are the filtered value of CDS daily prices
with respect to liquidity and market risk premia. The spectrum of the corresponding CDS implied credit
scores are calibrated based on the history relationship with the CRAs’ rating scores.
Weight and δ Score
The “δ-Rating” is obtained through the average of the accounting data based ratings and market im-
plied ratings using the credibility weight ω. Bu¨hlmann-Straub method3, the most extensively used and
important model in credibility theory, is applied to compute the weight ω (Bu¨hlmann and Alois(2005)).
Theorem 1 (Bu¨hlmann-Straub). The credibility estimator µ in the simple Bu¨hlmann-Straub model:
A.1 The random variables Xkj (j = 1, . . . , n) are, conditional on Θk = ϑ, independent with the same
distribution function Fϑ and conditional moments
µ(ϑ) = E[Xkj |Θk = ϑ],
σ2(ϑ) = V ar[Xkj |Θk = ϑ].
A.2 The pairs (Θ1, X1), . . ., (ΘK , XK) are independent and identically distributed.
is given by
µ = ωXi + (1− ω)X (2)
where
ω =
n
n+ σ
2
τ2
, σ2 = E[σ2(Θ)], τ2 = V ar(µ(Θ)). (3)
Xi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Xi,j X =
1
Kn
K∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Xij
Practically, in our case, Xj is the rating implied by the market information and X is the fundamental
rating estimated through accounting data. Moreover ω is the weight given to market implied rating and
lead to the“δ−rating”, as it is the weighted average of the two previous components.
δ Rating
For the exact same reason mentioned above, the numbers to the letters to give the ratings comparable
to the CRAs’ ratings need to be transferred. The ratings from these scores are given by the following
mapping:
Rδ (or RAcc or RCDS) =

AAA(Stable) if s0 < Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ s1
AAA(Negative) if s1 < Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ s2
AAA(Watch Negative) if s2 < Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ s3
...
D(Stable) if sn−1 < Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ sn−2
D(Negative) if sn < Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ sn−1
D(Watch Negative) if Sδ (or SAcc or SCDS) ≤ sn
3This approach is also called empirical Bayesian method
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where s0, s1, · · · , sn are given in Table 3.
3 Empirical Study
In this section, a sample of accounting and market data from 197 public traded companies who are rated
by the CRAs and with market data available are collected. These 197 companies are selected from 30
countries worldwide, and cover 35 segments of industry4.
In the first step, we use the data to recalibrate the CRAs’ quantitative credit scoring model. Then, the
accounting data based credit scores and market data based credit scores are derived from the sample.
Finally, the δ rating are calculated and compared with the CRAs’ ratings.
Accounting Data and Scores
Ratios in Table 4 of the selected 197 corporations are collected from Datastream, which is from 2004 to
2011 on annually basis. For each group of ratio, the accounting ratio with best data quality5 are selected.
Leverage ratio is calibrated by liabilities/assets; debt ratio equals total debt/total assets; liquidity ratio
equals current asset/liabilities; profitability ratio equals EBIT/assets. Table 6 exhibits statistics of the
whole period and sub-period from 2004-2007, and 2008-2011. Table 7 shows statistics of whole sample,
and sub-sample of investment and non-investment grade6 companies’ financial ratios. The results support
the hypothesis relations listed in Table 4, except for activity ratio. The investment grade corporations
have lower leverage and debt ratio, higher liquidity and profitability ratio, and bigger size. There is no
significant difference of the growth rate between the two groups.
To recalibrate CRAs’ quantitative rating model, different regression approaches are applied to the sample.
The results of the methods are summarized in Table 8 and 9. The p−values and the adjusted R2-values
indicate that the accounting data can explain around 30% to 50% of the ratings issued by the CRAs
with the simple linear regression. Yet, with logit and probit regression, the explanation power decrease
sharply to less than 10%. This observation is consistent with the rating methodologies announced by
the CRAs. Their reports state that they assign the rating according to the ordinary level of the ratios,
which is closer to linear regression than other regression models. Besides, after 2007 accounting ratios
give better explanation to ratings than before in terms of higher adjusted R2-values. It indicates that
the CRAs rely more on the fundamental data than other factors since the start of the crisis.
There is a clear break point for the influence of leverage ratio. Before the year 2007, the higher leverage
is considered as a positive sign for the credit quality. Whereas since the crisis, which was blamed for
excessive leverage, the high leverage is considered as the factor of credit quality with a negative symbol.
Activity ratio, profitability ratio and size played as a positive factor for corporation credit quality through
the eight years. Debt ratio had negative sign from 2004 to 2008, but the sign changed to positive after
2009. The interpretation is that during and after the crisis, only those bigger and stronger corporations
are able to financing themselves trough raising debt. The companies with weaker credit quality are either
forced to reduce their total debt or delist because of the capital chain break. Liquidity ratio show positive
sign from 2004 to 2009 but statistically insignificant. After 2010, it had positive sign and significant at
2011. This result is ambiguous. As we known, the new Basel regulation increased the requirement of
liquidity ratio for banks. Even through it is not implemented for corporations, there are many cases of
bankruptcy during the crisis because of the insufficient cash flow. The inconsistence of this regression
results with the fact in the market bring the doubt on the accuracy of the ratings given by the credit
rating agencies. Finally, influence of growth rate is not consistent through the years. It is reasonable,
because the growth rate depends on the development stage and industry of the corporations which is not
4The list of countries and industries are given in Table 4.
5Best quality in terms of less missing value and outliers.
6A corporation is considered investment grade if its rating is BBB- or higher by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch’s or Baa3
or higher by Moody’s or BBB(low).
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necessarily linear related to the credit quality of the corporation.
To test whether there is difference between the ratings given to investment grade and non-investment
grade corporations, we do the same regression to the two sub-groups of the data. The results are listed
in Table 10, 11, 12, and 13. There is no significant difference. Moreover, the results of panel regression
with pooling, fix effect, random effect, and logit and probit methods are tabulated in table 14. With the
simple pooling regression method, the panel data of financial ratios can explain around 30% of the CRAs’
ratings. The R2 of fixed effect, logit and probit regressions are much smaller, which indicate that the
CRAs do not consider the difference in business practices across companies, neither non-linear relation
between the accounting ratios and credit quality of the corporations. The R2 of random effect panel
regression is around 30% which means that there the ratings measure the changes over time but not
across entities. Compare the results between the year 2004-2006 and 2007-2011, there is a clear evidence
that the world switched from a leveraging to a deleveraging. Besides, the influence of liquidity ratio is
insignificant through the whole period, which indicate that this important credit variable has not been
paid enough attention by the CRAs. Across the 8 years, debt ratio showed negative sign; profitability,
activity and size are considered as a good signal; the influence of growth rate is still undefined.
To calculate the accounting data based ratings for the year 2012 and 2013, we collected the same ratios for
the sample and use the linear regression model with the data from 2007-2011 to estimate the accounting
data based credit scores. The forecast scores using the accounting data are compared with the credit
scores CRAs’ ratings. Figure 1 plots the accounting data based scores against the S&P’s rating scores
for year 2012 and 2013. Table 16 summaries the difference between the S&P’s rating scores and the
forecasted rating scores. The results show that accounting based scores are higher than the S&P’s rating
scores at the lower range of credit scores which corresponding to the category of non-investment grade
ratings. For the investment grade ratings, at the higher range of credit scores, accounting based scores
are lower than the S&P’s rating scores.
Figure 1: Accounting Data Based Credit Scores vs. S&P’s Rating Scores
Market Data and Score
The selected companies’ 5 year credit default swap (CDS) daily last price, bid and ask prices are collected
from Bloomberg on from the 1st Jan. 2008 to 31th Dec. 2011. Table 15 show the statistics of the sample
of CDS last, bid and ask prices by each rating groups according to the Moody’s updated rating at the
corresponding data collect date. If CDS prices reflect the credit risk of the corporations as the same way
of the CRAs’ ratings, then CDS of the reference entities with similar ratings should be priced similarly
or vice versa. Ideally, there should be a clear spectrum where the entity with higher rating has lower
CDS prices. The value in Table 15 indicates the level of CDS prices increase with lower ratings which
shows a clear relation with market information and CRAs’ ratings on an average level. However, there is
not a clear boundary of the CDS value for each rating group. Figure 4 shows the evolvement of the CDS
last, bid and ask price series through the time by each rating groups. Figure 5 show the average value
6
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of the select companies’ CDS daily last prices for each rating groups for the last six months’ CDS data
and ratings in 2013. A clear fact reflects from the time series plots is that CRAs’ rating is an ordinary
risk matrix rather than absolute risk estimation of the credit of the companies. The average CDS prices
varies significantly through the three years period within each rating groups. On the one hand, the fact
consistent with the CRAs’ principle of issuing the “through the cycle ratings”, on the other hand it
reflects market are much more sensitive to the actual credit quality of the entities which serves better
investors interesting.
To calculate the implied CDS rating of the selected companies. We collected a larger group of companies’
5 year CDS data to generate the spectrum of the CDS implied scores. Then, the data of 2012 and
2013 are applied to the generate the CDS implied credit scores. The results are show in Figure 2.
Market data implied credit scores show the same trends as the accounting data implied credit scores.
Generally, the non-investment grade rated companies’ credit qualities are underestimated with reference
to the CDS implied scores. On the other hand, the investment grade rated companies’ credibility are
overestimated. For each company, there are around 250 estimation point for the CDS implied credit
scores. The companies with lower credit scores tends to have more volatile estimations, which impairs
the stability of CDS implied ratings.
Figure 2: CDS Implied Credit Scores
δ-Rating
Based on the accounting data implied credit scores and CDS data implied credit scores, the weight w
is calculated by equation 3. Thereafter, the weighted averaged score Sδ,i is computed for each company
i. The accounting based credit scores, CDS implied scores, weights and δ-Score of period from July.
2013 to Dec. 2013 are summarized in Table 17 and exhibit in Figure 3. The CDS score is the average
market implied SCDS,i for each company, accordingly τ
2 is calculated by the 6 months’ variance. Since
accounting based credit scores are much stable compared to CDS implied credit scores, higher weight wi
are given to SAcc,i (Table 17).
Generally, δ-Score follows the same trend as the S&P’s rating scores. The disparity aggravates at the two
tails. Taken S&P’s rating scores as benchmark, SAcc,i, SCDS,i and Sδ,i all indicate lower credit quality
at the right tail and higher credit quality at the left tail for most companies. The cut-off line is around
0.55. According to S&P’s rating scores (Table 2), this is coincident with the threshold of investment
grate ratings. If a company has the score lower than 0.55, it will fall into the non-investment or ”junk”
investment rated groups. Since Sδ,i is the weighted average of SAcc,i and SCDS,i, it is not surprising that
the result follows the same feature as the accounting based credit score and CDS implied credit score.
Nevertheless, Sδ,i is more updated compare to SAcc,i and more stable compare to SCDS,i. Through the
weight w, and the time period of calculating SCDS,i and w, the more frequent market information and
less frequent fundamental information of the companies credibility are combined to have a relative stable
and updated estimation. This approach provide the flexibility of updating the credit information of the
7
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underlying entity and also abide by the fundamental information of the company.
Figure 3: Credit Scores and S&P’s Rating Scores
4 Conclusion
During last decades, credit rating agencies provided good service to financial market. They contributed
to the growing of over the border investment and international investment. Unfortunately, the value
of such their ratings has been questioned since the recent financial crisis. Criticism has been raised on
the credibility of the ratings. No matter it is because of the potential conflict of interest to earn high
fees for the issuers or the dated rating methodologies, the fact is the accuracy of their ratings are quite
questionable. In this paper, we studied the corporate ratings through two difference approaches and
propose a methodology to updating the credit information of the underlying entity and also abide by the
fundamental information of the company.
There are several interested results have been discussed in this study. Firstly, the accounting data are
used to recalibrate the CRAs’ rating methodology. After testing all the potential models, we find the
simple linear regression can provide the best explanation of their ratings using accounting ratios. The
study also shows that the model needs to be updated after the 2007 where the affect of leverage has
been changed for evaluating the credit quality of the company. Secondly, the CDS implied ratings are
consistent as the CRAs’ on an average level. The lower the CDS value, the higher the ratings of the
entity. The diverse happens when it comes to the very high or low rated companies. This scenario is true
for all the approaches which include the accounting data implied ratings, market data implied ratings
and the δ-ratings. This finding can help to explain the cases when the highly rated “AAA” companies
suddenly fallen into the bottom. But what is also interested is the underestimations on the other tails,
which indicated the potential investment opportunities might be underrated.
In brief, the results consistently proved the bias of CRAs’ ratings and provide several approaches to
adjust the CRAs’ ratings. It is true that only using quantitative modeling cannot capture the complex
structure of the credibility of the companies, but the experts adjustments should follow the correct logic
8
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and have strong rational rather than driven by the short-term benefits.
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S&P Moody’s Fitch
AAA Aaa AAA Prime
AA+ Aa1 AA+
High GradeAA Aa2 AA
AA- Aa3 AA-
A+ A1 A+
Upper Medium GradeA A2 A
A- A3 A-
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+
Lower Medium GradeBBB Baa2 BBB
BBB- Baa3 BBB-
BB+ Ba1 BB+
Non-Investment Grade SpeculativeBB Ba2 BB
BB- Ba3 BB-
B+ B1 B+
Highly SpeculativeB B2 B
B- B3 B-
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
Substantial RisksCCC Caa2 CCC
CCC- Caa3 CCC-
CC
Ca
CC
Extremely Speculative
C C
D C
DDD
In DefaultDD
D
Table 1: Rating Symbols of Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch’s Long-Term Ratings
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1 AAA Stable 0.67 BBB+ Watch Positive 0.34 B+ Negative
0.99 AAA Negative 0.66 BBB+ Positive 0.33 B+ Watch Negative
0.98 AAA Watch Negative 0.65 BBB+ Stable 0.32 B Watch Positive
0.97 AA+ Watch Positive 0.64 BBB+ Negative 0.31 B Positive
0.96 AA+ Positive 0.63 BBB+ Watch Negative 0.3 B Stable
0.95 AA+ Stable 0.62 BBB Watch Positive 0.29 B Negative
0.94 AA+ Negative 0.61 BBB Positive 0.28 B Watch Negative
0.93 AA+ Watch Negative 0.6 BBB Stable 0.27 B- Watch Positive
0.92 AA Watch Positive 0.59 BBB Negative 0.26 B- Positive
0.91 AA Positive 0.58 BBB Watch Negative 0.25 B- Stable
0.9 AA Stable 0.57 BBB- Watch Positive 0.24 B- Negative
0.89 AA Negative 0.56 BBB- Positive 0.23 B- Watch Negative
0.88 AA Watch Negative 0.55 BBB- Stable 0.22 CCC Watch Positive
0.87 AA- Watch Positive 0.54 BBB- Negative 0.21 CCC Positive
0.86 AA- Positive 0.53 BBB- Watch Negative 0.2 CCC Stable
0.85 AA- Stable 0.52 BB+ Watch Positive 0.19 CCC Negative
0.84 AA- Negative 0.51 BB+ Positive 0.18 CCC Watch Negative
0.83 AA- Watch Negative 0.5 BB+ Stable 0.17 CC Watch Positive
0.82 A+ Watch Positive 0.49 BB+ Negative 0.16 CC Positive
0.81 A+ Positive 0.48 BB+ Watch Negative 0.15 CC Stable
0.8 A+ Stable 0.47 BB Watch Positive 0.14 CC Negative
0.79 A+ Negative 0.46 BB Positive 0.13 CC Watch Negative
0.78 A+ Watch Negative 0.45 BB Stable 0.12 C Watch Positive
0.77 A Watch Positive 0.44 BB Negative 0.11 C Positive
0.76 A Positive 0.43 BB Watch Negative 0.1 C Stable
0.75 A Stable 0.42 BB- Watch Positive 0.09 C Negative
0.74 A Negative 0.41 BB- Positive 0.08 C Watch Negative
0.73 A Watch Negative 0.4 BB- Stable 0.07 D Watch Positive
0.72 A- Watch Positive 0.39 BB- Negative 0.06 D Positive
0.71 A- Positive 0.38 BB- Watch Negative 0.05 D Stable
0.7 A- Stable 0.37 B+ Watch Positive 0.04 D Negative
0.69 A- Negative 0.36 B+ Positive 0.03 D Watch Negative
0.68 A- Watch Negative 0.35 B+ Stable
*This table shows the mapping from the standard alphabets ratings to the numerical credit scores.
Table 2: Ratings and Corresponding Scores
[1, 0.995) AAA Stable [0.675, 0.665) BBB+ Watch Positive [0.345, 0.335) B+ Negative
[0.995, 0.985) AAA Negative [0.665, 0.655) BBB+ Positive [0.335, 0.325) B+ Watch Negative
[0.985, 0.975) AAA Watch Negative [0.655, 0.645) BBB+ Stable [0.325, 0.315) B Watch Positive
[0.975, 0.965) AA+ Watch Positive [0.645, 0.635) BBB+ Negative [0.315, 0.305) B Positive
[0.965, 0.955) AA+ Positive [0.635, 0.625) BBB+ Watch Negative [0.305, 0.295) B Stable
[0.955, 0.945) AA+ Stable [0.625, 0.615) BBB Watch Positive [0.295, 0.285) B Negative
[0.945, 0.935) AA+ Negative [0.615, 0.605) BBB Positive [0.285, 0.275) B Watch Negative
[0.935, 0.925) AA+ Watch Negative [0.605, 0.595) BBB Stable [0.275, 0.265) B- Watch Positive
[0.925, 0.915) AA Watch Positive [0.595, 0.585) BBB Negative [0.265, 0.255) B- Positive
[0.915, 0.905) AA Positive [0.585, 0.575) BBB Watch Negative [0.255, 0.245) B- Stable
[0.905, 0.895) AA Stable [0.575, 0.565) BBB- Watch Positive [0.245, 0.235) B- Negative
[0.895, 0.885) AA Negative [0.565, 0.555) BBB- Positive [0.235, 0.225) B- Watch Negative
[0.885, 0.875) AA Watch Negative [0.555, 0.545) BBB- Stable [0.225, 0.215) CCC Watch Positive
[0.875, 0.865) AA- Watch Positive [0.545, 0.535) BBB- Negative [0.215, 0.205) CCC Positive
[0.865, 0.855) AA- Positive [0.535, 0.525) BBB- Watch Negative [0.205, 0.195) CCC Stable
[0.855, 0.455) AA- Stable [0.525, 0.515) BB+ Watch Positive [0.195, 0.185) CCC Negative
[0.845, 0.835) AA- Negative [0.515, 0.505) BB+ Positive [0.185, 0.175) CCC Watch Negative
[0.835, 0.825) AA- Watch Negative [0.505, 0, 495) BB+ Stable [0.175, 0.165) CC Watch Positive
[0.825, 0.815) A+ Watch Positive [0.495, 0.485) BB+ Negative [0.165, 0.155) CC Positive
[0.815, 0.805) A+ Positive [0.485, 0.475) BB+ Watch Negative [0.155, 0.145) CC Stable
[0.805, 0.795) A+ Stable [0.475, 0.465) BB Watch Positive [0.145, 0.135) CC Negative
[0.795, 0.785) A+ Negative [0.465, 0.455) BB Positive [0.135, 0.125) CC Watch Negative
[0.785, 0.775) A+ Watch Negative [0.455, 0.445) BB Stable [0.125, 0.115) C Watch Positive
[0.775, 0.765) A Watch Positive [0.445, 0.435) BB Negative [0.115, 0.105) C Positive
[0.765, 0.755) A Positive [0.435, 0.425) BB Watch Negative [0.105, 0.095) C Stable
[0.755, 0.745) A Stable [0.425, 0.415) BB- Watch Positive [0.095, 0.085) C Negative
[0.745, 0.735) A Negative [0.415, 0.405) BB- Positive [0.085, 0.075) C Watch Negative
[0.735, 0.725) A Watch Negative [0.405, 0.395) BB- Stable [0.075, 0.065) D Watch Positive
[0.725, 0.715) A- Watch Positive [0.395, 0.385) BB- Negative [0.065, 0.055) D Positive
[0.715, 0.705) A- Positive [0.385, 0.375) BB- Watch Negative [0.055, 0.045) D Stable
[0.705, 0.695) A- Stable [0.375, 0.365) B+ Watch Positive [0.044, 0.035) D Negative
[0.695, 0.685) A- Negative [0.365, 0.355) B+ Positive [0.035, 0]p D Watch Negative
[0.685, 0.675) A- Watch Negative [0.355, 0.345) B+ Stable
*This table shows the mapping from numerical credit score between 0 to 1 to the standard alphabets ratings from D watch
negative to AAA stable.
Table 3: Boundaries of Rating Scores to Rating Letters.
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Accounting Ratio Correlation with Credit
Leverage Ratio Liabilities/Assets -
Liabilities/Tangible Assets -
Long Term Liabilities/Assets -
Debt Ratio Total Debt/Total Assets -
EBIT/Interest Expense +
Liquidity Ratio Current Assets/Liabilities +
Quick Ratio
1
+
Activity Ratio Account Payable/Net Sale -
Profitability Ratio EBIT
1
/Assets +
EBIT/Net Sales +
Net Income/Assets +
Net Income/Operating Income +
Retained Earnings/Assets +
Size Asset/CPI
2
+
Growth Rate
3
Current Operating Income/Last Operating Income +/-
Table 4: Financial Ratios
* In this table, we list the candidate accounting ratios examined in this study. Categories of the ratio are listed in the first
column. Second column exhibits the formula. The relation between the ratio and the credit quality are given in the last column.
For example, “+” means the increase in the ratio leads to the increase of the credit quality, or a better rating; “-” means the
increase in the ratio leads to the decrease of the credit quality, or worse rating.
1. EBIT refers to earning before interest and tax.
2. CPI refers to consumer price index.
3. Growth rates reflect the development stage of the corporation.
4. FFO refers to funds from operation.
5. EBITDA refers to earning before inters, tax, depreciation and amortization.
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Countries
AUSTRALIA LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM MALAYSIA
BRAZIL MEXICO
CANADA NETHERLANDS
CAYMAN ISLANDS NEW ZEALAND
DENMARK PORTUGAL
FINLAND PORTUGAL
FRANCE SPAIN
GERMANY SWEDEN
HONG KONG SWITZERLAND
INDIA THAILAND
ISRAEL UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ITALY UNITED KINGDOM
JAPAN UNITED STATES
KOREA VENEZUELA
Industries
AIRCRAFT & AEROSPACE: EQUIPMENT METALS & MINING
AUTOMOTIVE NATURAL PRODUCTS PROCESSOR
CHEMICALS NON-U.S. BANK
CONSTR & ENGINEERING SERV: HOMEBUILDING PACKAGING: PLASTICS
CONSUMER PRODUCTS PHARMACEUTICALS: GENERAL & SPECIALTY
DEFENSE REINSURANCE
ENERGY REIT
ENVIRONMENT REOC
FINANCE-CAPTIVE RESTAURANTS: FAST FOOD
FINANCE-NON CAPTIVE RETAIL
FOREST PRODUCTS: PULP & PAPER SECURITIES HOLDING CO.
GAMING: CASINOS SERVICES
HEALTHCARE TECHNOLOGY
INSURANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LODGING TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
MANUFACTURING U.S. BANK HOLDING CO.
MEDIA UTILITY
WHLSL DSTRBTN: HEALTHCARE
Table 5: Country and Segment coverage of Sample Data
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Statistic Rating Mean St. Dev. Min Max
PX LAST
AAA
37.448 9.510 12.990 65.950
PX BID 35.665 9.248 11.530 62.740
PX ASK 39.236 9.799 14.450 69.160
PX LAST
AA
61.432 27.745 12.927 190.809
PX ASK 60.365 28.773 11.232 194.783
PX BID 62.505 26.882 14.115 186.833
PX LAST
AA-
63.679 33.952 10.167 290.000
PX ASK 61.431 33.045 8.434 282.813
PX BID 65.923 34.996 11.160 297.188
PX LAST
A+
75.543 44.424 19.393 590.789
PX ASK 72.318 42.184 17.142 564.661
PX BID 78.777 46.908 21.391 616.916
PX LAST
A
93.906 71.730 14.353 687.104
PX ASK 91.606 70.791 12.020 681.316
PX BID 96.205 72.780 16.684 692.891
PX LAST
A-
120.832 85.359 21.505 696.856
PX ASK 118.753 84.340 19.960 680.242
PX BID 122.899 86.610 23.050 713.470
PX LAST
BBB+
122.222 88.604 31.273 929.386
PX ASK 118.904 86.306 26.879 902.990
PX BID 125.543 91.045 34.598 964.330
PX LAST
BBB
158.941 103.540 31.434 1,298.611
PX ASK 154.762 101.089 28.364 1,248.312
PX BID 163.124 106.066 32.787 1,348.910
PX LAST
BBB-
172.274 110.508 36.635 1,543.817
PX ASK 168.315 107.886 34.535 1,489.898
PX BID 176.234 113.283 38.736 1,597.736
PX LAST
BB+
289.721 193.666 48.553 1,972.479
PX BID 282.103 188.311 46.364 1,907.850
PX ASK 297.332 199.049 50.405 2,037.107
PX LAST
BB
309.619 199.260 51.619 1,660.993
PX BID 301.391 193.565 49.098 1,610.074
PX ASK 317.833 204.988 54.141 1,711.912
PX LAST
BB-
423.314 231.583 29.447 1,735.296
PX BID 413.431 226.330 27.784 1,708.415
PX ASK 433.175 236.809 31.109 1,777.215
PX LAST
B+
576.303 298.849 152.576 2,568.295
PX ASK 562.078 290.392 147.492 2,494.015
PX BID 590.534 307.401 157.660 2,642.575
PX LAST
B
789.877 415.043 193.222 3,309.824
PX ASK 768.528 399.755 186.299 3,140.742
PX BID 811.514 431.107 200.146 3,496.217
PX LAST
B-
1,087.992 607.673 257.500 3,974.826
PX BID 1,055.841 584.599 249.125 3,616.623
PX ASK 1,120.033 629.842 265.875 3,974.826
PX LAST
CCC+
1,347.919 1,342.924 132.139 9,580.198
PX BID 1,309.431 1,300.437 128.212 9,580.198
PX ASK 1,389.203 1,391.435 136.066 9,661.282
PX LAST
CCC
1,234.540 1,012.121 95.997 9,158.865
PX BID 1,197.341 968.938 91.083 7,952.916
PX ASK 1,269.413 1,045.610 100.910 9,298.397
Table 15: Statistics Summary of 5 year CDS Last Price, BID and ASK Price by Ratings
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Figure 4: History 5 year CDS Last Price, BID and ASK Price by Ratings
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Figure 5: Average 5 year CDS Last Price (2013 1st. July - 31 Dec.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Std.
2012 -0.28860 -0.07380 -0.01246 0.00000 0.07724 0.33010 0.09735615
2013 -0.275200 -0.079680 -0.016570 -0.004204 0.072800 0.344100 0.09686277
Table 16: Difference between the accounting based score and S&P’s rating scores
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Campany 197
S& P Rating Score 0.636 0.148 0.205 1.000
Accounting Score w 0.727 0.065 0.619 0.948
Accounting Credit Score 0.628 0.088 0.305 0.872
CDS Score 0.623 0.105 0.214 0.762
δ-Score 0.627 0.090 0.298 0.844
Table 17: Statistics of Credit Scores and weights(2013)
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